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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD KEITH LUDAHL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

DELMAR LARSON, Sheriff of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah,

Case No. 15713

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, RICHARD KEITH LUDAHL, appeals from dismissal of
his Writ of Habeas Corpus rendered in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter came on for hearing in front of the Honorable
Peter F. Leary on the Writ of Habeas Corpus and was dismissed and
the plaintiff-appellant remanded to the custody of the Sheriff
for extradition to the State of Oregon.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks dismissal of the Governor's Warrant
and extradition proceedings against him, or in the alternative,
reinstatement of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and a new hearing on the
sufficiency of the Governor's Warrant and extradition proceedings_
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

against him.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 27, 1977, the appellant was arrested on a
fugitive warrant from the State of Oregon.

Fugitive charges were

filed against him in City Court and the first hearing on that matti
set for February 25, 1977.

On February 25, 1977, the matter was

continued for an additional 30 days to the 28th day of March, 19l1
On the 28th day of March, 1977, i t was

--------

a]:._~~ged

Governor's Warrant had arrived and the fugitive charges

that a
against

---

appellant were dismissed and the appellant was arraigned in Distri::
--~

Court on the Governor's _Warrant.

At that time the appellant requer

time for a petition for a Governor's

~earj.~g

and/or a Writ of Habea

ii

:1
I

--

Corpus.

The Court granted time for that and set bond in the matter

and the appellant was

release~.

On May 18, 1977, a Governor's Hearing was had and subseque:
the Governor, having taken the matter under advisement, denied the
appellant's petition for refusal of extradition by the Governor.
- - - - - The Governor's Hearing having failed, the app~llant filed
a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Cor~'!s on November 18, 1977. That
petition came on for hearing before the Honorable Peter F. Leary
on February 2, 1978.
On that occasion appellant contended that the docume?ts

supporting the Governor's Warrant were inadequate in that they fai'.:
to ~i~de an affidavit as required by Chapter 56 and Title 17of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ccah Code Ann.

The Court heard argument on the matter and denied

:he Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered that the
appellant be taken back into custody and extradi.!=ed by to the State
of Oregon.

The appellant was surrendered at that point and was, within
the next few days, returned to the State of Oregon.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN THAT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED WERE
NOT SUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-56-3.
The provisions for proceeding in an extradition matter are
set forth in Chapter 56 of Title 77 of Utah Code Ann.

The only

remedy provided for the test of a Governor's Warrant under that

chapter is set forth in §77-56-10.

That section provides that:

If the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he
or they desire to test the legality of his arrest
the judge of such court of record shall fix a
reasonable time to be allowed him within which to
apply for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
In the case of Little v. Beckstead, 358 P.2d 93 (1961) at
94, this court said that the plaintiff should be allowed to test

the validity of the extradition proceedings and challenge whether
the statutory requirements had been met.

In Mora v. Larson, 540 P. 2d

520 (1975) at 521, this court held that:
· . . in extradition proceedings the governor's
rendition warrant makes a prima facie case and shi~t~
the burden to the petitioner to show that he is no_t
tbe person named therein.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It has been generally held that a Writ of Habeas Corpus
may

attack the extradition proceeding on three substantive groun:

First, that he is not the same person that the demanding state
wants.

Second, that he was not in the state at the time that the

state alleges that he was in that state.

Third, that the crime f::

which the state is attempting to extradite is not a crime in that
demandi~~ s~te.

In addition to the substantive grounds the

petitioner may attack by way of Writ of Habeas Corpus, the procedu:
inadequacies of the extradition proceeding.

This court has said

in Little v. Beckstead, supra, at page 94:
The proper process for testing the legal sufficiency
and validity of plaintiff's arrest and detention
is the habeas corpus proceeding. It is statutory
in Utah that persons arrested upon a Governor's
Warrant for extradition shall be given the
opportunity to apply for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
to test the legality of the arrest. Plaintiff
should have been allowed to test the validity of
the extradition proceeding and challenge whether
the statutory requirements had been met.
In that same case, the court, however, §!S_ta,blished that it was in

-----

fact a valid concern for the trial court to examine and test the

----··--

-------·---------

sufficiency of the documents that had been submitted by the demanding state.
In the case at bar, the appellant sought to do just that
In the case of Birmingham v. Larson, 490 P.2d 893 (1971), Justice
Ellett's writing for a unanimous court says at page 494:
Our statute sets out the requirements for the issuance of the governor's rendition warrant. Those
requirements in substance are:
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(1) A written request from the executive of the
demanding state alleging (a) that the accused
was present in the demanding state at the time
of the corrrrnission of the alleged offense, and
that (b) thereafter he fled the state.
(2) A copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate
of the demanding state with a copy of any warrant
which was issued thereon, together with
(3)
the
has
the

A statement by the executive authority of
demanding state that the person claimed
(a) escaped from confinement, or (b) broken
terms of his bail, probation or parole.

It is the contention of the appellant that nothing in the
documents submitted to the trial court constituted an appropriate
affidavit made before the magistrate of the demanding state as
required by subsection (2) quoted from Birmingham v. Larson, supra.
There is amongst those documents filed with the court a statement
of the crime which 1 is ts the charge but is not signed

to.

,gnci not

swo~n

It is apparently the basis for the Governor's Rendition Warrant.

The appellant contended before the trial court that that was insufficient in that it was in no way an affidavit as required by the
statute by §77-56-3 and as set for in Birmingham v. Larson, supra,
and that therefore the documentations submitted by the State of
Oregon was insufficient to allow the extradition of the appellant.
Based upon this failure of the documentation required,
the appellant feels that a dismissal of the extradition proceeding
against him is appropriate.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
RIGHT TO APPEAL BY VIRTUE OF THE COURT'S ORDER THAT
HE BE IMMEDIATELY EXTRADITED TO THE STATE OF OREGON
AND BY THE SUBSEQUENT TAKING OF THE APPELLANT
PRIOR TO THE APPEAL PERIOD LAPSING.
The appellant in this case was appointed counsel because
he was found by the court to be indigent.

In connection with the

filing of a Writ of Habeas Corpus the appellant filed an Affidavit
of Impecuniosity verifying

his continued indigency.

of the taking of his appeal he

At the time

was incarcerated, first at the Salt

Lake County Jail and then in Oregon, he was unemployed and had no
source of income.
Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (c) provides
that a bond on appeal is required in all cases but if the appellant
is indigent, he may file an affidavit as set out in Utah Code Ann

§21-7-3 (1953).

Such an affidavit will waive the bond on appeal.

The Affidavit of Impecuniosity meets the requirements set out in
Utah Code Ann. §21-7-3 (1953) and no bond on appeal is required.

-

However, Rule 73 (d) sets forth the conditions for obtaini:
a stay of judgment pending an appeal.

That r~]:_~_ P!Ovid_e~ th<?_tif

the appellant desires a stay of judgment during the pendency of the
-------------·~------.......

-··--

appeal, he must file. ~--~\.lperse~eas in an amount set by the court .
...__.--·----

-

That section does not provide for the indigent appellant.

From

those two sections it is clear that while the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure make allowances for the indigent appellant in that they
waive the cost of the bond on appeal.

They do not provide any
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mechanism whereby the indigent defendant can obtain a stay judgment
during the pendency of that appeal.
The the conclusion of the trial court hearing after the
court had denied the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (T. 78)
and after the court had ordered him returned to Oregon (T. 78) the
counsel for the appellant asked for a stay of even a few minutes in
order to discuss with the appellant the possibility of an appeal
and was denied a stay of execution on the sentence for even that
long.

Faced with that difficulty there was no way for the appellant,

being indigent, to prevent the State of Oregon from coming to take
him immediately.

Oregon got him wi thip ten da_ys and the appeal

was filed at the direction of the appellant from his incarceration
in the State of Oregon.
It is the appellant's contention that he was denied his
constitutional rights in that he was taken from this state without
benefit of appeal, and secondly, that he was prevented from staying
---~

~-..-.~.·-

·-~....

-·

--..:,.~

the judgment of the court because he was in fact not able to.. ~t
a supersedeas bond and therefore, by virtue of his poverty, deprived
of rights that he would otherwise had been able to purchase.

In

the case of Washington v. Renouf, 299 P. 2d 620 (1956), this court
held that the state's power to try a person accused of a crime is
not impaired by the fact that he was brought within the territorial
jurisdiction by illegal means.

The implication of this in an

extradition proceeding is that if a person is deprived of his rights
md removed illegally and in violation of the provisions of Title 77,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Chapter 56 to the demanding state then he, as a practical matter,
has no remedy.
In the case before the court, this is precisely what has
happened.

The appellant has no way to prevent his being removed

from the state before he has had an opportunity to fully litigate
his matters in court.

Perhaps this is an explanation for the

paucity of extradition cases of first impression that had been
before this court.
CONCLUSION
Towards that end the appellant asks simply that

~e

•

be

granted a dismissal of the extradition and that the case ·'be dismissed, or in the alternative, remanded to the District Court.
While this has no direct effect and is not binding on the State of
Oregon, appellant submits that legal proceedings there will be able
to take into consideration the court's holding in this case, and
take appropriate action.

G;t~Qj
BRAD RICH
Attorney for Appellant
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